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Beyond Paradigms provides a clear vision of how politi-
cal science can advance by de-emphasizing paradigmatic de-
bates and using diverse theories to develop policy-relevant
research. The book makes two vital contributions. First, it draws
on the philosophy of social science to diagnose the problems
and costs associated with organizing political science around
self-styled Kuhnian paradigms or Lakatosian research pro-
grams, such as the “isms” in the international relations sub-
field: (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism, constructivism. Second, it
demonstrates that an alternative way of doing business al-
ready exists, presenting numerous examples of analytically
eclectic research that builds upon but goes beyond paradig-
matic frameworks to produce theoretically interesting and
policy-relevant results. Although the book is focused on the
international relations subfield, the authors rightly note that
these contributions can promote closer connections to other
subfields in political science and to the social sciences more
generally, including psychology, sociology, history, and eco-
nomics (2010: 36).
These are major achievements that deserve the attention
of all political scientists. In this brief review I first put these
achievements in the context of developments in political sci-
ence and the philosophy of social science. I then suggest
ways in which Beyond Paradigms could be even clearer on
the issues of theoretical cumulation, standards of progress,
and ways to locate eclectic research within the field. In particu-
lar, I argue that creating a taxonomy of the theories about so-
cial mechanisms that constitute the building blocks of analyti-
cally eclectic research can provide the discursive and peda-
gogical benefits that paradigms have conveyed without incur-
ring the costs associated with reifying these paradigms.
Paradigms, Research Programs, and Eclecticism
Beyond Paradigms persuasively argues that over-empha-
sizing paradigms as the central organizing principal of research
in international relations has inhibited progressive and policy-
relevant research and diverted attention and energy into un-
productive scholastic debates. Many political scientists have
long shared the sense that framing our arguments and organiz-
ing our syllabi in terms of grand schools of thought, including
Kuhnian paradigms, Lakatosian “research programs,” or other
such large-scale “isms,” does not actually represent the way
most of us think about politics, political science, or our re-
search. Indeed, Albert Hirschman warned in 1970 of the danger
that an excessive focus on building paradigms could become a
“hindrance to understanding” (Hirschman 1970). Hirschman’s
warning went largely unheeded in the subfield of international
relations, where the reification of the “isms” into grand schools
of thought has been especially stark. This approach has be-
come even more exaggerated as scholars have introduced a
host of name-brand versions of realism and liberalism—classi-
cal, neoclassical, defensive, and offensive realism, commercial
and institutional liberalism, etc.—as if it were possible to
achieve simple but widely applicable “covering law” style gen-
eralizations if only we could get the right theoretical assump-
tions within the general framework of one paradigm or another.
Many scholars sense that this approach has become unpro-
ductive, but lacking any clear alternative for framing the field
in ways that transcend the confines of the “isms” without
giving up the convenient terms of reference that the isms have
provided, political scientists have plodded along with the
“isms” in our research and teaching.
This state of affairs is partly due to the fact that most
political scientists are woefully out of date in their reading of
the philosophy of social science. Most contemporary political
scientists have not read much philosophy beyond the 1960s
and 1970s, when first Thomas Kuhn and later Imre Lakatos
strongly influenced political scientists’ views of their field.
Kuhn focused his attention on the history of the physical
sciences and used the term “paradigms” to argue that “sci-
ence” consists of large-scale views of the world with many
underlying and interlocking assumptions, and that new para-
digms occasionally replace old ones through “scientific revo-
lutions” that focus on resolving the anomalies of existing views.
Kuhn argued that the outcome of these revolutions is decided
as much by the sociological process of achieving support
among scientists as by any independent standards of proof or
progress (Kuhn 1962).
Lakatos later critiqued Kuhn for having an unacceptably
subjective approach to scientific progress, and he attempted
to provide methodological rather than sociological standards
for assessing scientific progress. Lakatos argued that theories
should not be falsified at the first sign of anomalies, but should
be thought of in the context of larger “research programs” with
unfalsifiable “hard core” assumptions and falsifiable “outer
belt” assumptions. In this view, research programs might even-
tually be able to resolve anomalies in progressive ways that
uncovered “novel facts,” or they might ultimately prove “de-
generative” through their inability to do anything more than
provide ad hoc explanations of individual anomalies (Lakatos
1970). Still, Lakatos retained Kuhn’s assumption that the focal
activity of science was constructing, defending, testing, refin-
ing, and sometimes shifting sharply between the large-scale
webs of interconnected assumptions that he termed “research
programs” to distinguish his understanding of science from
Kuhn’s emphasis on paradigms.
International relations scholars have taken Lakatos quite
literally and set about trying to specify the “hard core” and
“outer belt” assumptions of each of the leading paradigms
(see, for example, Hopf 1998). This reification of the isms con-
tributed to a “cookie cutter” style of journal articles that was
particularly prominent in the 1990s. Each scholar would take a
substantive problem or a puzzle, begin their article with
“Neorealism says this about my problem, neoliberalism says
this, constructivism says this,” and then corral evidence to de-
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throne two of the isms and enshrine the third as the one true
faith.
The limitations of this approach are now quite clear. As Sil
and Katzenstein convincingly argue, the isms are not in fact
mutually exclusive or incompatible with one another, and no
single paradigm can provide the kind of comprehensive and
policy-relevant research that can be achieved by combining
theoretical variables from different research traditions. Indeed,
even the scholars most prominently associated with the lead-
ing international relations schools of thought— the “neorealist”
Kenneth Waltz, the “neoliberal” Robert Keohane, and the
“constructivist” Alexander Wendt—have readily drawn on al-
ternative traditions in their work. Keohane has discussed so-
ciological as well as transactions costs approaches to institu-
tions (Keohane 1988), Wendt has pointed to the importance of
material power and the centrality of states in the international
system as currently (but not timelessly) constituted (Wendt
1995), and as Sil and Katzenstein note (2010: 38), Waltz’s earlier
work emphasizes the importance of combining different im-
ages or levels of analysis to understand world politics. Al-
though these scholars have not wedded themselves as exclu-
sively to one ism or another as tightly as is commonly thought,
their identification as leading and successful innovators in
their respective schools of thought led many of their followers
to focus their research more exclusively within the borders of a
single paradigm.
Against this backdrop, Sil and Katzenstein make the case
that an alternative approach has continued a quiet but produc-
tive existence obscured by the attention devoted to the isms.
This approach, which they term analytic eclecticism, does not
reject the insights generated within paradigmatic schools of
thought. Instead, drawing on more recent developments in the
philosophy of science such as scientific realism, it shifts the
explanatory focus from large-scale paradigms to the narrower
theories about causal mechanisms that have been developed
within the context of paradigms. Analytic eclecticism empha-
sizes using combinations of such theorized mechanisms from
different paradigms to understand policy-relevant phenom-
ena. Sil and Katzenstein devote three chapters to analyses of
over a dozen excellent examples of analytically eclectic work in
the areas of global security, political economy, and regional as
well as global governance.
The Challenges of Cumulation and Progress in Research
Beyond Paradigms makes an enormous contribution by
properly diagnosing a central problem in the field, identifying
the solution, and demonstrating that the solution has already
proven viable in extant research. At the same time, there are
important costs associated with moving beyond paradigms.
For all its faults as an organizing principle in the field, the
reliance on paradigms provided a common vocabulary and a
sense that progress was being made (though claims of progress
have often been contested, as Sil and Katzenstein point out
(2010: 217)). Paradigms have gathered groups of theories about
causal mechanisms together in ways that have proved memo-
rable and easy to convey. The challenge for an alternative
approach is to provide a similarly useful framework for dis-
course without creating new constraints on theorizing and
research.
Sil and Katzenstein are very cognizant of this problem.
They note the contributions of paradigms in providing a basis
for easy discourse (2010: 35), which is one reason that they do
not advocate entirely breaking from the isms. They also state
explicitly that analytic eclecticism is not a license to act as if
“anything goes” in research (2010: 16). Still, Beyond Para-
digms could be even clearer on how analytically eclectic re-
search can achieve cumulative progress, how it can be located
within the field, and how it can be communicated to colleagues
and students. For example, by explicitly eschewing a “syn-
thetic guide to eclectic research” (2010: 3) out of concern that
this would be yet another hindrance to understanding, they
miss an opportunity to gain more converts to their cause and
to provide clearer advice for both research and pedagogy. The
term “eclecticism” compounds this problem, as it can be mis-
read as suggesting a non-cumulative approach with proce-
dures and standards that are difficult to codify or communi-
cate.  Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines “eclectic”
as “selecting what appears to be best in various doctrines,
methods, or styles,” which is clearly what Sil and Katzenstein
intend, but it also includes as synonyms the words “indis-
criminate,” “kitchen-sink,” “motley,” “ragtag,” “patchwork,”
and “promiscuous.” Perhaps the term “structured pluralism,”
which Sil and Katzenstein reference from Dow (2004), better
captures the kind of research the authors want to encourage.
Sil and Katzenstein add to the problem by stating that
analytically eclectic research “may not constitute progress in
the sense of... continuous refinements in a given theory” (2010:
47). Even though the qualifying word “may” suggests that
cumulation is also possible, it would be better to make the
justifiable positive case that approaches combining theories
on diverse mechanisms can indeed lead to cumulative theo-
retical gains. Such progress has already been achieved through
eclectic research on the inter-democratic peace, democratiza-
tion, alliance burden-sharing, and other problem-driven top-
ics.
One line of argument that would help here would be a
clearer explication of what cumulation of eclectic research would
look like. The authors reference the “combinatorial logic” (2010:
18) of bringing theories about diverse mechanisms into the
same explanatory framework, and they also invoke Robert
Merton’s notion of “middle range theories” (2010: 22, 37, 209),
but it remains unclear how such combinatorial logic works or
what would constitute cumulation in middle range theories.
Two useful approaches that deserve mention in this context
are Charles Ragin’s discussion of fuzzy set theories (Ragin
2000), and my own analysis with Alexander George of typo-
logical theorizing (George and Bennett 2005: 233–262). Both
allow for combinatorial theorizing that combines many con-
cepts and mechanisms, treats cases as configurations of vari-
ables or mechanisms, and allows for cumulation as new con-
cepts, variables, theories, or cases are added to previous re-
search findings.
The ambiguity on the prospects for and paths toward
cumulation in Beyond Paradigms is intensified by the authors’
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focus on Larry Laudan’s writings on the philosophy of sci-
ence. As Sil and Katzenstein argue, Laudan’s concept of “re-
search traditions,” which allows for researchers drawing on
different theoretical frameworks that coexist for long periods
of time, better fits actual practices in political science than
Kuhnian paradigms or Lakatosian research programs. Sil and
Katzenstein rightly acknowledge, however, that “unlike Kuhn
and Lakatos, Laudan offers no uniform model of how to track
the progress or decline of successive or competing approaches”
(2010: 7). The problem is even deeper, as Laudan has only very
vague advice on how to judge not only among large-scale
research traditions, but among competing explanations of his-
torical cases or competing theories on individual causal mecha-
nisms. Sil and Katzenstein also offer only very general advice
on how to judge research on its “quality of evidence, falsifi-
ability, and generalizability” (2010: 216).
In this context, I find that Lakatos’s concept of “novel
facts” remains useful even though his distinction between the
hard core and outer belt of research programs does not hold up
(Bennett 2003). As later elaborated by other scholars, “novel
facts” can be judged by the standards of “use novelty” and
“background theory novelty” (Elman and Elman 2003). Evi-
dence has use novelty and can be used to provide an indepen-
dent test of a theory if this evidence was not used to generate
the theory. This provides a check on the well-known psycho-
logical tendency toward confirmation bias. A hypothesis has
background theory novelty if it proposes to explain a phenom-
enon that is unexplained by or anomalous for other theories.
Following the logic of Bayesian updating, background theory
novelty increases our confidence in the likely truth of a theory.
Scholars need not agree on paradigms, research traditions, or
delineations of hard cores and outer belts to be able to agree
that specified evidence would have use novelty or background
theory novelty relative to specific theories or explanations.
A Taxonomy of Theories about Causal Mechanisms
The question remains as to whether it is possible to de-
vise a synthetic guide to research that provides a framework
for communication and draws on diverse theories without be-
coming so structured that it confines the pluralism Sil and
Katzenstein seek. From my own work on causal mechanisms,
and partly inspired by Katzenstein’s and Sil’s earlier work on
analytic eclecticism, I have been working to develop such a
framework.  My current working draft of this effort, presented
below in Table 1, can be construed as a more detailed version
of Katzenstein’s and Sil’s diagram (2010: 21) illustrating how
eclectic scholarship combines structural, agent-centered, ma-
terial, and ideational theories.
The top three rows of Table 1 include the three leading
paradigms of international relations theory, but by foreground-
ing the kinds of mechanisms upon which they draw and back-
grounding paradigmatic labels, the table seeks to avoid the
problem of reifying paradigms into mutually exclusive schools
of thought. Power, legitimacy, and functional efficiency form
the basis of sociological as well as political science approaches
to institutions (Mahoney 2000). The column labels across the
top of Table 1 provide the different possible combinations of
moves between and among agents and structures.  The inter-
sections of these four columns and the top three rows provide
examples of theories about the relevant underlying mecha-
nisms. These examples are only illustrative, as there are many
different theories about social mechanisms that could be lo-
cated within the relevant categories, including collective ac-
tion theory, principle-agent theory, theories about cognitive
Table 1: A Taxonomy of Theories on Social Mechanisms
Legitimacy:
Constructivism,
Logic of
Appropriateness
Power:
(Neo)Realism
Logic of
Consequences
Functional
Efficiency:
Neoliberalism
Logic of
Consequences
Levels of
Analysis:
Fields of
Study:
Agent to Agent
Emulation
Socialization
Hegemonic
Socialization
Emulation
Individual
Psychology
Agent to Structure
Norms, Entrepreneurs,
Framing
Institutional Reform,
Revolution
Functional
Competition,
Innovation
Individual Affects
Higher Levels of
Analysis
Economics, Sociology,
Social Psychology
Structure to Structure
Unintended Evolution
of Social System
Power Transitions
Macroeconomic Sequences,
Path Dependency, Adverse
Selection, Moral Hazard
System-to-System
Dynamics
Economics,
Evolutionary Biology
Structure to Agent
Culture as Enabler
and Constraint
Resources as Enabler
and Constraint
Evolutionary
Selection
Systems, States, Orgn’s,
Small Groups Enable and
Constrain Individuals
Economics, Sociology,
Social Psychology
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heuristics and biases, and so on. The fourth row of the table
indicates the levels of analysis associated with each com-
bination of agents and structures. Finally, the bottom row of
the table serves the important function of providing links to
other social sciences that constitute useful sources for cross-
fertilization of theoretical ideas.
Table 1 is a taxonomy of theories rather than a theory of
everything. It is meant to serve as a useful platform for locat-
ing research within the field and a basic checklist to assess
whether a researcher has omitted important categories of theo-
rized causal mechanisms. It is also intended to provide a sense
of order and finiteness among the diverse theories upon which
eclectic research can draw without unduly limiting these theo-
ries. Like recent efforts noted by Sil and Katzenstein (2010:
220) that bring together historical, rational choice/economic,
sociological, and other institutionalisms (Mahoney 2000), it
provides a basis for general questions that are almost always
relevant to political research:  For which actors does an insti-
tution or practice have or lack legitimacy? Which powerful
actors had an interest in creating this institution, and which
powerful actors see it as in their interests to sustain, change,
or abolish it? Through what combination of legitimacy, power,
and functional efficiency did this institution win out over
alternatives when it was first formed, and what combination
of factors sustains it? To what challenges might it be vulner-
able, by what agents or structures with what combinations of
legitimacy, power, and efficiency? Although very general, such
questions, and the taxonomy that undergirds them, can pro-
vide reassurance to those reluctant to move beyond paradigms
that research drawing on diverse mechanisms can be orderly,
cumulative, and easily communicated to colleagues and stu-
dents.
A Revitalized Prose for the Study of Politics
Most of the explanatory power that political science has
achieved resides in the theories about causal mechanisms that
scholars have developed in the context of paradigms, not in
paradigms themselves. Like Moliere’s bourgeois gentleman,
political scientists have been writing in the prose of theories
on causal mechanisms without realizing it. Beyond Paradigms
exposes the limitations of thinking exclusively in terms of para-
digms, but it does not discard the useful theories that paradig-
matic research has generated. By grounding political science
more firmly in the contemporary philosophy of social science,
the authors direct attention and energy away from the inward-
looking and excessive focus on inter- and intra-paradigmatic
debates that has marked the field for the past several decades
and toward the use of diverse theories to understand political
phenomena relevant to policymakers and citizens. A new gram-
mar for the study of politics has finally come into view.
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“The central problem of our age is how to act decisively in
the absence of certainty.” —Bertrand Russell
“We can’t all be intellectuals or there wouldn’t be any-
thing to eat.” —Cuban farmer quoted on NPR 9/21/10
As Bertrand Russell indicates, the challenge of our time is
to deal with problems characterized by uncertainty. The Cuban
farmer’s quip provides a pragmatic corollary to Russell’s ob-
servation, or injunction. Grasping this challenge entails reori-
enting how we study world politics, as well as broader atten-
tion to the ways in which collective understanding is orga-
nized. Moreover, as Sil and Katzenstein (Sil/K) hope, such
knowledge may actually be transmitted to decision makers to
improve our plight. In short, they seem to be suggesting that
we can better understand the dynamics of politics by talking
about them in a more focused way.
Following the cease-fire in the most recent war of the great
debates declared in the 1998 50th anniversary issue of IO, we
have been waiting for the next direction for the field. Sil/K’s
effort seeks to provide the guidelines for developing policy-
relevant and analytically warranted understandings about
world politics. Their analytic eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein
2010a; 2010b) provides a framework for addressing what they
